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This paper develops a two-country, general equilibrium model of oligopoly in which the
degree of horizontal product differentiation is endogenously determined by ￿rms’ strategic
investments in product innovation. Consumers seek variety and product innovation is more
skill intensive than production. Stronger import competition increases innovation incentives,
and thereby the relative demand for skill. An intraindustry trade expansion following trade
liberalization can therefore increase wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers.
In addition, since product differentiation is resource consuming, freer trade entails a potential
trade-off between production and variety. The import competition effect highlighted by the
model, which plays a key role in determining the general equilibrium, is consistent with panel
data on Chilean manufacturing plants.
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11 Introduction1
In the late 1970s a group of theorists working independently (Krugman, 1979; Lancaster, 1980;
Norman, 1976) revolutionized the way economists think about international trade with a powerful
insight: trade liberalization induces similar nations to specialize in different varieties of the same
product, giving rise to intraindustry exchanges, as consumers love variety. The empirical domi-
nance of this form of trade, formerly posing a major challenge to trade theory, therefore ceased to
be a puzzle. Furthermore, a new and potentially important source of gains from trade was uncov-
ered: intraindustry trade specialization allows economies of scale and expands the set of product
varieties available to consumers, thereby increasing aggregate welfare.
The conceptual framework that made this breakthrough possible was the monopolistic com-
petition model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Lancaster (1979) and Spence (1976). By making it
possible to study imperfect competition in a tractable general equilibrium framework, this model
has naturally become the workhorse theory of international trade, alongside the perfect competi-
tion paradigm.2 The elegance and simplicity of the monopolistic competition model comes at a
cost, however. The set of differentiated varieties into which ￿rms can specialize is exogenously
given, and there is no cost to product differentiation. Consequently, in equilibrium each variety
is produced by a single ￿rm, which acts as a monopolist in the market for it. While the different
varieties of a given product are linked by the elasticity of substitution, producers do not engage in
any form of strategic interaction.
In this paper we develop a model of oligopoly in general equilibrium to argue that the process
by which ￿rms differentiate their product from their rivals’ requires skilled labor and is affected
by strategic interaction between producers. As a result, an intraindustry trade expansion follow-
ing trade liberalization has potentially important implications for the relative rewards of skilled
and unskilled workers and the intersectoral allocation of resources. In addition, since product dif-
ferentiation is resource-consuming, trade liberalization between similar nations entails a potential
trade-off between production and variety.
To formalize these arguments we build on the model by Neary (2009), who offers a theoreti-
cally consistent but tractable model of oligopoly in general equilibrium (GOLE).3 There are two
1We would like to thank, without implicating, Matias Busso for sharing the plant data with us, and Daniel Bern-
hofen, Udo Kreickemeier, Kjell Erik Lommerud, Frode Meland and seminar participants at the New University of
Lisbon for valuable comments. The views expressed in this paper are exclusively those of the authors and not those of
the Inter-American Development Bank.
2Krugman (2009) offers a detailed account of the steps and state of mind that paved the way for the increasing
returns revolution in trade and geography, and reviews some of the many fruitful directions in which the framework
has been extended in the past three decades. From an empirical perspective, Broda and Weinstein (2006) offer an
assessment of the "love of variety" gains from trade in the United States.
3See also Neary (2003) for a non-technical overview, and Neary (2007), Neary and Tharakan (2008) and Bastos
and Kreckemeier (2009) for other applications.
2countries each in which there is a continuum of imperfectly competitive industries. Firms have
market power, allowing for strategic interaction, within their own industries. However, since each
industry is small relative to the economy as a whole, each ￿rm treats factor prices, goods prices in
the other sectors and national income parametrically. As in the monopolistic competition model,
consumers seek variety and ￿rms produce horizontally differentiated products. As a distinctive
feature of our setup, the degree of product differentiation is endogenously determined, as ￿rms
optimally decide how much to invest in product innovation, taking into account that this process
requires skilled labor. We also deviate from the standard framework by assuming that some in-
dustries are open to trade while others are shielded from international competition. Aggregation
across sectors allows for the endogenous determination of economy-wide variables, most impor-
tantly factor rewards and aggregate welfare.
The key partial equilibrium result of our model is that trade cost reductions in non-shielded
industries increase ￿rms’ incentives to invest in product innovation in order to horizontally differ-
entiate their products from those produced by their foreign rivals. This strategic effect is shown to
be predominantly caused by increased import competition, leading ceteris paribus to an increase
in the relative demand for skilled labor. However, since trade is intraindustry, trade liberalization
also leads to higher export volumes. Assuming that product innovation requires skilled labor while
production requires unskilled labor, the effect of trade liberalization on the relative demand for
skilled and unskilled labor is consequently ambiguous.
In general equilibrium we show that globalization ￿ measured either as a marginal trade cost
reduction in non-shielded industries or a marginal reduction in the number of shielded industries
￿ generally leads to higher wages for both skilled and unskilled workers. The effect on the skill
premium is generally ambiguous but more likely to be positive the larger the share of industries
that remain shielded from international competition, and the more elastic unskilled labor supply
is relative to skilled labor supply. If skill upgrading is possible, we also identify a potential wel-
fare trade-off between output and variety. If innovation incentives outweigh production incentives,
globalization might paradoxically lead to less total output, but this will be compensated for by
greater product variety. Even without innovation, we show that the welfare effects of globalization
are not clear-cut in our model. When parts of the economy are shielded from international com-
petition, globalization leads to a reallocation of resources from shielded to non-shielded industries
with ambiguous welfare consequences.
We proceed by showing that the partial equilibrium import competition effect highlighted by
our model, which plays an important role in determining the general equilibrium, is consistent
with Chilean panel data on manufacturing plants for the period 1996-2006. Using movements in
industry-speci￿c import tariffs and real exchange rates to identify exogenous changes in the degree
of international competition, we ￿nd that manufacturing plants respond to harsher market rivalry in
3their own industry by increasing the share of skilled (non-manual) workers among the workforce
related to the production process. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, we show that the
data appear to rule out the possibility that this effect is fully explained by a number of competing
mechanisms, notably process innovation, exporting, foreign direct investment and outsourcing.
The theory we propose contributes to reconcile a number of salient, but as yet not fully con-
nected stylized facts, which together remain puzzling in the light of the Heckscher-Ohlin and
intraindustry trade theories. While a signi￿cant proportion of trade ￿ows is intraindustry in na-
ture, many trade liberalization episodes were followed by an increase in wage inequality between
skilled and unskilled workers (Greenaway and Nelson, 2001; Bastos and Silva, 2008; Brulhart,
2009). Furthermore, this increase in inequality was not speci￿c to skill-abundant nations (Gold-
berg and Pavcnik, 2007). Taken together, these facts leave both the traditional and the new trade
theories in a dif￿cult position. The former is able to explain an increase in wage inequality in
richer nations, but would predict the converse to happen in developing nations. Although mod-
i￿ed versions have been developed that can account for an increase in inequality in developing
countries (Davis, 1996), the explanation relies on intersectoral reallocations of resources towards
skill-intensive industries which ￿nd scant support in the data (Wacziarg and Wallack, 2004). The
latter is able in turn to explain the prevalence of intraindustry specialization, but is silent with
regard to the effects of freer trade on wage inequality.4 Our theory predicts that wage inequal-
ity could increase precisely because of intraindustry specialization in horizontally differentiated
products, being therefore able to accommodate the above facts.
This paper also builds on the theory of oligopoly in partial equilibrium. In seminal work,
Brander(1981)andBranderandKrugman(1983)useaone-sectormodeltoshowthatintraindustry
trade in homogeneous products may arise due to strategic interaction between ￿rms. Bernhofen
(2001)extendsthisframeworktoallowforexogenousproductdifferentiation, andshowsthatitalso
generates intraindustry trade in differentiated products even in the absence of increasing returns to
scale, and irrespective of whether competition is Cournot or Bertrand.5 As in the current paper, but
in a closed economy setting, Lin and Saggi (2002) assume that product differentiation is costly and
showthatitisaffectedbystrategicinteractionbetweenproducers. Byfocusingonasingleindustry,
however, this framework is not suited to examine general equilibrium interactions between goods
markets and factor markets, a fact that is considered to be at the root of the relatively minor role
thus far played by oligopoly theory in international trade (Neary, 2003, 2009, 2010).
4An integrated version of these two models, commonly referred to as the Chamberlin-Heckscher-Ohlin model,
relaxes this assumption (Helpman, 1981; Helpman and Krugman, 1985). However, its implications for the effect on
trade on relative factor rewards are similar to those of traditional trade theory and rely on intersectoral reallocations of
resources due to comparative advantage.
5Several authors have also extended the reciprocal dumping framework by including unionized labor markets in
order to study wage responses to trade liberalization in a partial equilibrium setting (see, e.g., Naylor, 1998, 1999;
Straume, 2002, 2003; Lommerud, Meland and Słrgard, 2003; Bastos, Kreickemeier and Wright, 2009).
4Anumberofrecentpaperslinkglobalizationtowageinequalityinthecontextofheterogeneous-
￿rmstrademodelsofmonopolisticcompetition. Yeaple(2005)modelsasituationinwhichinitially
identical ￿rms end up being heterogeneous due to technology choices and worker heterogeneity.6
Trade liberalization induces the most productive ￿rms to enter the export market, raising demand
for skilled labor and thereby the skill premium. Verhoogen (2008) develops a heterogeneous-￿rm
model with vertical product differentiation in which an exchange rate devaluation induces export-
market entry and product quality upgrading to appeal to richer Northern consumers. Production
of higher-quality varieties requires higher-quality workers, implying that entry into export markets
tends to increase wage dispersion within industries, a mechanism that is supported by Mexican
plant-level data. In contrast to these papers, a distinctive feature of our model is to highlight the
role of strategic interactions between producers in shaping ￿rms’ incentives to invest in product
innovation, which implies that trade liberalization may affect relative demand for skill via both
import competition and exporting. The empirical part of the paper suggests that increased im-
port competition affects manufacturing plants’ relative demand for skilled workers in a way that is
consistent with our model.
An alternative explanation for the observed increase in returns to skill in developing nations is
the rise in foreign investment and outsourcing activities by ￿rms originally located in developed
countries. In particular, Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b) suggest that such an outcome could arise
if the outsourced activities are low-skill in a rich country like the US, but high-skill in developing
nations. In the empirical analysis of this paper, we show that the positive effect of tariff reductions
on Chilean plants’ relative demand for skill is not speci￿c to foreign-owned ￿rms. In addition, we
provide evidence that an appreciation of an industry-speci￿c real exchange rate index generates a
qualitatively similar effect, which is dif￿cult to reconcile with the outsourcing hypothesis.
Our paper is also related to a strand of literature suggesting that trade liberalization may in-
crease wage inequality via greater incentives for skill-biased process innovation, including Ace-
moglu (2003), Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999), Ekholm and Midelfart Knarvik (2005) and
Thoenig and Verdier (2000). In seeking to explain the aforementioned stylized facts, however,
these models are vulnerable to the critique that in many countries trade liberalization was followed
by an increase in wage inequality, but not by signi￿cant aggregate productivity growth (Gordon,
2000; Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2001). An exception is Neary (2002) who draws attention to the
role of lower import barriers in determining ￿rms’ strategic investment in process innovation to
deter foreign entry. In contrast to Neary (2002), however, the current paper stresses the role of
trade-induced product innovation and shows that relative demand for skilled labor may increase
even when actual intraindustry trade volumes expand. Moreover, it uncovers a potential trade-
6Bustos (2005) embeds a similar mechanism into a heterogeneous-￿rm trade model a la Melitz (2003) and derives
similar implications.
5off between production and variety, which might contribute to explain the coexistence of trade
liberalization, increased wage inequality, and slow productivity growth.
Finally, the theory of this paper contributes to making sense of an emerging body of evidence
suggesting that increased import competition fosters product innovation in both developed and de-
veloping countries (Bertschek, 1995; Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen, 2009; Fernandes and Paunov,
2009; Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrel, 2010; Lu and Ng, 2009). In the context of this strand
of work, a distinctive aspect of our empirical analysis is the focus on the effect of international
competition on the relative demand for skilled workers within manufacturing plants, a mechanism
that, as discussed above, plays an important role in our theoretical model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the setup of the theo-
retical model. Section 3 shows how the partial equilibrium in the production game is determined.
Section 4 solves for the general equilibrium with exogenous product differentiation. Section 5 in-
troduces endogenous product differentiation in partial equilibrium, before Section 6 analyzes the
general equilibrium. Section 7 presents the data employed and discusses the empirical strategy,
then presents the empirical results. Finally, Section 8 offers some concluding remarks.
2 Theoretical Model
There are two identical countries ￿ "domestic" and "foreign" ￿ and in each country there is a
continuum of imperfectly competitive industries de￿ned on the unit interval. In line with the
GOLE framework of Neary (2009), ￿rms have market power, allowing for strategic interaction,
within their own industry. However, since each industry represents an in￿nitesimal part of the
economy, each ￿rm treats all economy-wide variables as exogenously given.
In each industry, two horizontally differentiated products are produced by, respectively, a do-
mestic and a foreign ￿rm. However, some of these industries are shielded from international
competition while others are not. More speci￿cally, in all industries z 2 [0;b z] both domestic and
foreign ￿rms engage in intraindustry trade, ￿ la Brander (1981) and Brander and Krugman (1983),
under the assumption of Cournot competition in segmented markets, where internationally traded
goods are subject to a per-unit tariff t. In each of the remaining industries z 2 (b z;1] there is a
domestic (foreign) monopolist that is shielded from international competition.
In each industry, ￿rms play a two stage game. In the ￿rst stage, as in Lin and Saggi (2002),
￿rms invest in product innovation which increases the degree of horizontal product differentiation.
In the second stage, ￿rms choose production quantities at home and abroad under the assumption
of market segmentation. Realistically, product innovation is more skill intensive than production.
We capture this in a simple way by assuming that product innovation requires only skilled labor,
6while production requires only unskilled labor.7 We will explore different assumptions about the
supply of the two types of labor.
The utility of a representative consumer in the domestic country is given by
U [qi (z);qj (z)] =
Z 1
0
u[qi (z);qj (z)]dz; (1)
where, in each sector z, qi is quantity consumed of the domestic product while qj is quantity
consumed of the foreign product. Notice that, due to our assumption of shielded and non-shielded
sectors, qj = 0 for z 2 (b z;1]. We assume that the sub-utility function takes the following quadratic
form:





2 + qj (z)
2 + 2b(z)qi (z)qj (z)
￿
; (2)
where the implied degree of product differentiation, b￿1, will be endogenously determined by
the amount of product innovation undertaken by the ￿rms in each industry. It is thus potentially
industry-speci￿c. More speci￿cally, b(z) is given by b(si;sj), where si and sj are the amounts of
skilled labor employed by the domestic and foreign ￿rm, respectively. We assume that @b
@sk < 0 and
@2b
@s2
k > 0 for k = i;j. Since product innovation only affects parameter b, only ￿rms in non-shielded
sectors that face international competition have incentives to spend resources on innovation activ-
ities.8
We assume that each product can be produced using unskilled labor in a constant-returns-to-
scale technology where one unit of output requires one unit of labor.9 Both types of labor are
perfectly mobile across industries within a country but internationally immobile. Denoting the
skilled and unskilled wage in the domestic country by ws and wu, respectively, ex ante pro￿ts for
a representative domestic ￿rm in industry z 2 [0;b z] are given by
￿i (z) = ￿i (z) ￿ wssi (z); (3)
where
￿i (z) = pi (z)qi (z) + [p
￿
i (z) ￿ t]q
￿
i (z) ￿ wu [qi (z) + q
￿
i (z)]: (4)
7If we relax this assumption to let both types of activities require both types of labor, our results will be qualitatively
the same as long as product innovation is more skill intensive than production.
8We model product innovation as a change in b, which is a parameter in the utility function, but we should not
interpret this as changing consumers’ preferences (as in the case of persuasive advertising). Rather, we can think of
consumers having preferences over a range of possible varieties but where only two of them are actually available
in the market. If product innovation means that a ￿rm stops producing the current variety and switches to producing
a different variety that is more differentiated from the product supplied by the competitor, this would be exactly
equivalent to a reduction in b.
9Notice that by assuming constant returns to scale we are shutting down one of the two sources of gains from trade
identi￿ed by Krugman (1979), namely economies of scale.
7Here and throughout the analysis, variables with an asterisk refer to the foreign country.10 By
setting si = 0 and q￿
i = 0 in (3)-(4), we arrive at the pro￿ts for a representative ￿rm in industry
z 2 (b z;1].





￿ (1 ￿ qi (z) ￿ b(z)qj (z)) if z 2 [0;b z]
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1￿b(z)2 (pi (z) ￿ b(z)pj (z)) if z 2 [0;b z]
1 ￿ ￿pi (z) if z 2 (b z;1]
: (6)
Assuming that b is identical in all non-shielded industries (which will be the case in equilibrium),




















































The indirect utility function of the representative domestic consumer, which is the relevant measure























i (z) is the quantity exported and sold to the foreign country by the domestic ￿rm in industry z, while p￿
i (z) is
the price this ￿rm can charge in the export market.
11Where appropriate, we use "b" to denote variables that refer to the shielded sectors of the economy.
12In addition to wage income, we assume that pro￿ts and tariff revenues are costlessly redistributed to consumers.
13Thefactthatthesubutilityfunction(2)isaspecialcaseoftheGormanpolarformallowsforconsistentaggregation
over consumers with different incomes and enables us to use a representative consumer framework (see Neary, 2009).
14Again we assume that b(z) = b for z 2 [0;b z].
8In this paper we are foremostly interested in studying the effects of globalization on wages and
resource allocation between innovation and production in general equilibrium. In our modelling
framework we have two adequate measures of globalization: (i) a reduction of trade costs (lower t)
in non-shielded industries, and (ii) a reduction in the number of shielded industries in the economy
(higher b z). In the following, we will refer to t￿1 as the degree of product market integration, while
we refer to b z as the degree of trade openness.
3 Partial Equilibrium in the Production Subgame
We start by solving the model in partial equilibrium at the second stage of the game. Due to the
segmented market hypothesis, we can analyze the two markets separately. Furthermore, since the
two countries are identical in all respects, it must be the case that ￿
￿ = ￿, w￿
u = wu and w￿
s = ws
in equilibrium.
For a given value of b, and in a non-shielded industry z 2 [0;b z], the optimal quantities set by
the domestic and foreign ￿rms in the domestic market are indirectly given by
1
￿




(1 ￿ 2qj ￿ bqi) ￿ wu ￿ t = 0: (10)





(1 ￿ ￿wu)(2 ￿ b) + ￿bt






(1 ￿ ￿wu)(2 ￿ b) ￿ 2￿t
(2 ￿ b)(2 + b)
: (12)





(1 ￿ ￿wu): (13)
As the real variables are homogeneous at degree zero in ￿
￿1, wu and t, we can adopt the
usual convention of choosing the marginal utility of income as numeraire and normalize by setting




(2 ￿ b)(1 + wu (1 + b)) + bt






(2 ￿ b)(1 + wu (1 + b)) + t(2 ￿ b2)
(2 ￿ b)(2 + b)
; (15)
while pro￿ts are given by
￿i = ￿j =
((2 ￿ b)(1 ￿ wu) + bt)
2
(2 ￿ b)
2 (2 + b)
2 +
((1 ￿ wu)(2 ￿ b) ￿ 2t)
2
(2 ￿ b)
2 (2 + b)
2 ; (16)
where the ￿rst (second) term is the pro￿t earned from the home (export) market. It follows from





(1 ￿ wu): (17)











4 General Oligopolistic Equilibrium with Exogenous Product
differentiation
We consider ￿rst the case where the degree of product differentiation is exogenously given, imply-
ing that only unskilled labor is demanded. The labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive
with the supply of unskilled labor inelastically given by Lu. In general equilibrium, demand must










15This implies that wages are expressed in real terms at the margin (Neary, 2007).
10or, using (11), (12) and (13),
Lu = b z
￿
2(1 ￿ wu) ￿ t
2 + b
￿
+ (1 ￿ b z)
1
2
(1 ￿ wu): (21)
In general equilibrium, the unskilled wage is given by
wu = 1 ￿
2(Lu (2 + b) + tb z)
￿
; (22)
where ￿ := 2 + b + (2 ￿ b)b z > 0. This implies that the condition for intraindustry trade in the
non-shielded industries is t < Lu (2 ￿ b). Since @wu=@t < 0 and @wu=@b z > 0, the following
result obtains:
Proposition 1. In general oligopolistic equilibrium with exogenous product differentiation, the
unskilled wage will increase as a result of globalization, measured either as product market inte-
gration (lower t) or increased trade openness (higher b z).
This result is not surprising and is well in line with previous literature. A trade cost reduction
implies that each ￿rm in non-shielded industries faces stronger import competition. In a symmetric
model with two-way trade, this also implies that the competitiveness of each ￿rm increases in
the export markets. With linear demand, the export market effect always outweighs the import
competition effect, leading to an overall increase in labor demand. Due to the economy-wide
resource constraint (￿xed labor supply), the unskilled wage will increase in general equilibrium.
This leads in turn to a reallocation of resources from shielded to non-shielded industries. Notice
also that the positive wage effect of increased product market integration is stronger the larger
the share of industries that are opened to trade (b z). The effect of opening up more industries to
international competition is similar, since this is equivalent to reducing trade costs from above to
below the prohibitive level in more industries.
Since total resources in the economy are ￿xed, the wage increase due to lower t or higher b z
generally implies that globalization shifts rents from ￿rms to workers. However, the effects on
pro￿ts are different in shielded and non-shielded sectors, and it is not necessarily the case that
all ￿rms suffer from increased international competition. Clearly, all ￿rms in shielded sectors are
negatively affected by lower trade costs in non-shielded industries, due to the increased cost of







t(4 + b2 + b z (2 ￿ b)(2b + (2 ￿ b)b z)) ￿ 2Lu (2 ￿ b)
2 (1 ￿ b z)
￿
(2 ￿ b)





4(4Lu ￿ t(1 ￿ b z))(Lu (2 ￿ b) ￿ t)
￿3 < 0: (24)
11If more industries are opened up to trade, this reduces equilibrium pro￿ts for ￿rms in the indus-
tries that were already non-shielded. This is simply due to higher wages. However, a trade cost
reduction has an ambiguous effect on pro￿ts in the non-shielded industries. In particular, if both b z
and t is suf￿ciently low, reduction of trade costs will increase pro￿ts. The reason is that the wage
increase will be counteracted by an output expansion due to a shift in resources from shielded to
non-shielded sectors. This is not possible if all industries are open to trade (i.e., b z = 1); in this
case a trade cost reduction will effectually just be a transfer of rents from ￿rms to workers.
Proposition 2. (i) Increased trade openness (higher b z) leads to lower pro￿ts in all sectors of the
economy.
(ii) Product market integration (lower t) leads to lower pro￿ts in shielded sectors while pro￿ts
in non-shielded sectors will increase if t and b z are both suf￿ciently low.
In general equilibrium, prices in industries z 2 [0;b z] are given by
pi = 1 ￿
￿





pj = 1 ￿
￿




while prices in industries z 2 (b z;1] are given by
b pi = 1 ￿
Lu (2 + b) + tb z
￿
: (27)
Inserting these equilibrium prices into (8), we can derive an expression for domestic welfare that
is a function of parameters b, t, b z and Lu :
V =
"









t((4 ￿ 3b2) + b z (2 ￿ 3b)(2 ￿ b)) ￿ 2Lub(2 ￿ b)




2 ￿2 : (28)





2 (1 ￿ b z) ￿ t((4 ￿ 3b2) + b z (2 ￿ 3b)(2 ￿ b))
2(2 ￿ b)
2 ￿2 : (29)
Interestingly, the sign of (29) is generally ambiguous and depends crucially on the degree of trade
openness (b z) and the degree of product differentiation (b￿1). If all industries are open to trade (i.e.,
b z = 1), (29) reduces to
@V
@t





2 < 0; (30)
12implying that a trade cost reduction always increases welfare as long as products are differentiated
(b < 1). Even if total output is unchanged in general equilibrium, the product mix changes (some
home-market production is replaced by export production) and welfare increases due to a love-of-
variety effect.
However, if some sectors are shielded from trade, product market integration will shift some
production from shielded to non-shielded sectors. This will increase the price differential between
non-shielded and shielded products, which ￿ all else equal ￿ reduces welfare. This means that the
overall welfare effect of product market integration is positive only if the love-of-variety effect is
suf￿ciently strong. In the special case of homogeneous products, where the love-of-variety gain
from trade is eliminated, product market integration will always reduce welfare as long as some
sectors are shielded from international trade:16
@V
@t
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
b=1
=
b z (Lu ￿ t)(1 ￿ b z)
2(3 + b z)
2 > 0: (31)
A similar ambiguity is found when we consider the welfare effect of increasing the degree of













4(1 ￿ b) ￿ b
2￿
+ b z (2 ￿ b)
￿
4(1 + b) ￿ b
2￿￿
: (32)





. However, if products are suf￿ciently close substitutes, we see that increased trade
openness will reduce welfare if the number of shielded sectors is suf￿ciently high to begin with.
For the special case of homogeneous products (b = 1), a marginal increase in trade openness will
reduce welfare if b z < 3=7.
Proposition 3. (i) Product market integration (lower t) will always increase welfare if domestic
and foreign products are differentiated and all sectors are open to trade. If some sectors are
shielded from trade, product market integration will reduce welfare if products are suf￿ciently
close substitutes.









, a marginal increase in trade openness will reduce
welfare if the initial number of shielded sectors is suf￿ciently high.
16Notice that t < Lu is required for intraindustry trade to take place in general equilibrium. This condition secures






Let us now consider the more general case where ￿rms can invest in product innovation at the
￿rst stage of the game. Innovation incentives are only present in non-shielded sectors, where ex
ante pro￿ts are given by (3). As in Lin and Saggi (2002) we assume that, in each non-shielded
industry, investments in product innovation by the domestic and foreign ￿rms have the same mar-
ginal effects on the degree of horizontal product differentiation. More speci￿cally, we assume that
b = b(si + sj), with b0 (￿) < 0 and b00 (￿) > 0. This implies that innovation investment is a pure
public good for the two ￿rms; i.e., the investment of one ￿rm bene￿ts both ￿rms equally. Naturally,
this implies that each ￿rm has an incentive to free-ride on the innovation investment undertaken by
the competing ￿rm.
Assuming that the innovation technology is the same in all industries, the ￿rst-order condition
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A closer inspection of (34) reveals that
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A comparison with (17) shows that e t is very close to the prohibitive level of trade costs for all
b 2 [0;1]. Thus, we restrict attention to the case of t < e t, where ￿rms have an incentive to
horizontally differentiate their products for every initial level of product differentiation.17
From (33), the equilibrium level of product innovation (and, correspondingly, the demand for
skilled labor) is given by s￿
i = s￿
j = s￿ (wu;ws;t). By total differentiation of (33) we can derive
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Proposition 4. (i) Product market integration (lower t) will increase incentives for product inno-
vation in non-shielded industries. (ii) Innovation incentives decrease in both the skilled and the
unskilled wage level.
The ￿rst part of the proposition is the key partial equilibrium result of our analysis. If the de-
gree of international competition intensi￿es due to trade cost reductions, each ￿rm has a stronger
incentive to spend resources on differentiating its product from that of its foreign competitor. No-
tice that this result is primarily driven by increased import competition. Using (16), where pro￿ts
are de￿ned as a sum of pro￿ts from home market and export market sales, we can decompose the
effect of lower trade costs on innovation incentives through these two different channels. If we
denote the pro￿t from home market and export market sales by ￿h
i and ￿e
i, respectively, we have
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2 > 0;
con￿rming that the import competition effect is the dominant force with respect to innovation
incentives: lower trade costs increase import competition, which ￿rms can partly escape by differ-
entiating their products more.
Regarding the wage effects on innovation incentives, the negative effect of a higher skilled
wage is obvious, since this directly increases the cost of product innovation. The effect of the un-
skilled wage on innovation incentives is more interesting, particularly with respect to general equi-
librium effects, which will be discussed shortly. A higher unskilled wage means that production
is more costly, which reduces pro￿ts for all degrees of product differentiation. This consequently
reduces the gain of spending resources on innovation activities.
6 General Oligopolistic Equilibrium with Product Innovation
In general equilibrium, we are primarily interested in how globalization ￿ interpreted as reductions
in either trade costs or the number of shielded industries ￿ affects the demand for skilled versus
unskilled labor and thereby the skill premium ( ws
wu). We will analyze this question under different
assumptions about the supply of skilled and unskilled labor.
156.1 Fixed Labor Supply
Assume ￿rst that the supply of skilled and unskilled labor is ￿xed and given by Ls and Lu, re-
spectively. Using the previously derived expressions for labor demand in partial equilibrium, the
market for skilled labor is cleared when
b zs
￿ (wu;ws;t) ￿ Ls = 0; (39)
while the market for unskilled labor is cleared when
b z
￿
2(1 ￿ wu) ￿ t
2 + b(s￿ (wu;ws;t))
￿
+ (1 ￿ b z)
1
2
(1 ￿ wu) ￿ Lu = 0: (40)
Totally differentiating (39)-(40) and applying Cramer’s Rule, the equilibrium wage effects with

















The effect of product market integration on the unskilled wage is unambiguously positive and
does not depend directly on innovation incentives. The intuition is equivalent to the one given for
Proposition 1. The effect on the skilled wage, however, is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand,
trade cost reductions increase innovation incentives, which drives up the skilled wage. On the other
hand, demand for unskilled labor is also increased, which drives up wu and dampens innovation
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< 0; (43)
which con￿rms that the direct effect always dominates the indirect one.
Thus, a marginal reduction in trade costs leads to higher wages for both types of workers.
Obviously, the effect on the skill premium depends on the relative strength of the wage responses.
A direct comparison of (42) and (43) shows quite clearly that the parameters b z and t both play a
crucial role. While the unskilled wage response is independent of t, a higher initial level of trade
costs will increase the response of the skilled wage, thus increasing the likelihood that product
market integration increases the skill premium. A higher skill premium due to lower trade costs is
also more likely if the number of shielded sectors in the economy is high. This is most clearly seen
16by considering the limit b z ! 0. In this case, a trade cost reduction will unambiguously increase
the skilled wage while leaving the unskilled wage (almost) unchanged in general equilibrium.
The reason is that the increase in the economy-wide demand for unskilled labor is smaller if the
number of non-shielded industries (which are the ones affected by a trade cost reduction) is low.
The dampening effect of an unskilled wage increase on innovation incentives is correspondingly
low and the skill premium will increase.
We summarize as follows:
Proposition 5. With ￿xed labor supply, product market integration (lower t) leads to higher wages
for both skilled and unskilled labor in general equilibrium. The skill premium will increase if the
number of shielded industries in the economy is suf￿ciently high. The scope for an increase in the
skill premium is larger if trade costs are high to begin with.
Turning now to the wage effects of increased trade openness, we set, for simplicity, trade costs





















where jJj = ￿b z @s￿
@ws
2+b+(2￿b)b z
2(2+b) > 0 and ￿ := 4s￿b0 (￿) + 4 ￿ b2 > 0.18 Compared with the wage
responses to trade cost reductions, we see here that the wage effects of increased trade openness
are somewhat less clear-cut. The unskilled wage will increase, but the sign of the skilled wage
response is ambiguous. More precisely, the skilled wage will increase if b z remains suf￿ciently
low but may decrease otherwise. If one more industry is opened to trade, demand for both types of
labor will increase in this sector. However, the resulting increase in the unskilled wage will dampen
innovation incentives ￿ and thus demand for skilled labor ￿ in all industries that are already open
to trade. If these industries constitute a suf￿ciently large part of the economy, the overall effect
of opening up one more industry to trade could be that the wage level for skilled labor is reduced
in general equilibrium. However, as long as b z remains suf￿ciently low, increased trade openness
will always increase the skilled wage and, by comparing (44) and (45), we also see that the wage




condition must always hold in equilibrium, since
(2￿b)(1￿wu)
2
(2+b)2 is larger than any possible pro￿t gain from product
innovation.
17response will be stronger for skilled than for unskilled labor, implying a higher skill premium.19
The intuition is similar to the equivalent result for trade cost reductions.
Proposition 6. With ￿xed labor supply and zero trade costs in non-shielded industries, a marginal
increase in trade openness will increase the unskilled wage while the skilled wage response is
ambiguous in general equilibrium. Both the skilled wage and the skill premium will increase if the
number of shielded industries remains suf￿ciently large.
6.2 Elastic Labor Supply
Let us now relax the assumption of ￿xed labor supply and assume that the supply of skilled and
unskilled labor is given by Ls (ws) and Lu (wu), respectively, where @Ls
@ws > 0 and @Lu
@wu > 0.20 That
the labor supply of skilled (unskilled) labor only depends on the skilled (unskilled) wage level
implies that we here disregard the possibility of skill upgrading. We will return to that issue in the
next subsection.
For simplicity, we will here set b z = 1 and just focus on the effects of trade cost reductions.
Using the two general equilibrium conditions, (39)-(40), with Ls = Ls (ws) and Lu = Lu (wu),































As with ￿xed labor supply, both wage responses are unambiguous in sign. The negative sign of
(46) is con￿rmed by noticing that, compared with (41), elastic supply of skilled labor just adds a
negative term in the numerator. It is more interesting to see how the relationship between product
market integration and the skill premium is affected by elastic labor supply. Since the numerator
of (46) is decreasing in the magnitude of @Lu


















if b z is suf￿ciently low.
20Since we are only interested here in the general equilibrium effects of globalization on the skill premium, we
include elastic labor supply in a rather ad hoc fashion, by simply assuming that the total number of skilled and
unskilled labor units supplied are increasing functions of the skilled and unskilled wage, respectively. In order to make
welfare inferences we would have to endogenously derive labor supply from individual utility maximization.
18magnitude of @Ls
@ws, we have the following result:
Proposition 7. Product market integration (lower t) is more likely to increase the skill premium if
the supply of unskilled labor is elastic relative to the supply of skilled labor.
The intuition behind this result is twofold and composed of a direct and an indirect effect. The
direct effect is obvious: the more elastic the supply of unskilled labor, the lower the equilibrium
wage increase due to lower trade costs. However, there is an indirect effect through innovation in-
centives. A lower wage increase for unskilled labor will increase incentives for product innovation
and reinforce the skilled wage increase.
6.3 Costless Skill Upgrading
At least in the longer run, one would expect that even if total labor supply is ￿xed, the relative
remuneration of skilled and unskilled labor will in￿uence the relative supply of these two types of
labor. If we allow for skill upgrading (or downgrading), resources can be shifted between the two
activities: innovation and production. If the total amount of resources in the economy is ￿xed, this
has interesting implications for the welfare effects of globalization. Since consumers enjoy both
higher output and more product variety, there is a welfare trade-off between the two activities in
the economy. If globalization leads to a shift in resource use from production to innovation, the
love-of-variety effect of globalization will be reinforced, but this comes at the expense of lower
total output. Vice versa, globalization might paradoxically lead to less product variety if resources
are shifted from innovation to production, but this is then compensated for by an increase in total
output.
We can illustrate this trade-off in a simple way by assuming that skill upgrading is costless.
This effectually means that wages will be identical for skilled an unskilled workers in general
equilibrium. Assuming that total labor supply is ￿xed and equal to L, a share ￿ will be allocated
to innovation while the remaining share (1 ￿ ￿) will be allocated to production. The share ￿ will
then be endogenously determined in general equilibrium by the following two market- clearing
conditions:
b zs
￿ (w;t) ￿ ￿L = 0; (48)
b z
￿
2(1 ￿ w) ￿ t
2 + b(s￿ (w;t))
￿
+ (1 ￿ b z)
1
2
(1 ￿ w) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)L = 0; (49)
where w is the uniform wage level for both types of labor/activities. Totally differentiating (48)-
(49) and applying Cramer’s Rule, the effects of product market integration on wages and resource
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Equivalently, the effects of a marginal increase in the degree of trade openness (where we set t = 0




















2 (1 ￿ b z)





s￿ (2 + b)￿ + b z @s￿
@w (1 ￿ w)[4(1 + s￿b0 (￿)) ￿ b2]
L
￿
(2 + b)￿ ￿ 2b z @s￿
@w (2 + b)
2 + 4b zb0 (￿) @s￿
@w (1 ￿ w)
￿ ? 0: (53)




numerators. It is straightforward to see that @￿
@t < 0 and @￿
@b z > 0 if b z is below a (strictly positive)
threshold level:
Proposition 8. With ￿xed total labor supply and costless skill upgrading, globalization (lower
t or higher b z) leads to higher wages while the effect of resource allocation between innovation
and production is generally ambiguous. Labor resources will be shifted from production towards
innovation if the number of shielded industries (1 ￿ b z) remains suf￿ciently high.
These results are not surprising in light of the previous analysis and the intuition follows our
previous discussion. Since the partial equilibrium effect of globalization is an increase in demand
for both types of labor/activities, wages will obviously increase in general equilibrium. Due to the
total resource constraint of the economy, resources will be shifted one way or the other. In general
equilibrium, a key parameter for determining the direction of resource reallocation is the share of
shielded versus non-shielded industries. The larger share of the economy that is shielded from
international competition, the more likely it is that (marginal) globalization will lead to lower total
output and more product variety.
207 Empirical Analysis
An important mechanism of our theoretical model is that, under fairly general assumptions, ￿ercer
importcompetitionwithin-industriesincreases￿rms’incentivesforproductinnovation, andthereby
relative demand for skilled labor. This effect is partial equilibrium in the sense that it results from
the strategic interaction between ￿rms within industries, each of which is small relative to the econ-
omy as a whole. Once the full set of general equilibrium effects is accounted for, however, it has
potentially important implications for the distribution of national income and aggregate welfare.
In this section, we show that this partial equilibrium import competition effect is consistent
with rich Chilean panel data on manufacturing plants. We begin with a brief description of our
data, deferring a more detailed exposition to the Appendix below. We then discuss the empirical
strategy and present the econometric results.
7.1 Data
The main data set we use in the empirical analysis is Chile’s Annual National Industrial Survey
(ENIA) for the years 1996 to 2006. This data set is a census of manufacturing plants with more
than 10 employees. Each plant has a unique and time-invariant identi￿er, which allows us to form
a panel. The set of ￿rm attributes includes total employment, total production, value added, export
volume, proportion of foreign-owned capital, and industry code (4-dig ISIC). Importantly for our
purposes, the information on employment is divided into occupational categories, notably: owners,
directors, administrative and other staff not related to production, skilled (non-manual) workers
related to the production process, and unskilled (manual) workers linked directly or indirectly to
production activities.21
We have supplemented the plant-level panel with information on industry-speci￿c import-
weighted tariffs and real exchange rates (Revenga, 1992; Bertrand, 2004), both de￿ned at the
4-dig level of the ISIC classi￿cation. These measures are constructed from bilateral import tar-
iffs and real exchange rates between Chile and its trading partners, using as weights the share of
imports from each trading partner in a base period (1996-1997). Data on scheduled import tar-
iffs by industry-country come from the UNCTAD TRAINS data set, while information on imports
(also by industry-country) come from the UN COMTRADE data set. Data on nominal bilateral
exchange rates and CPIs come from the IMF International Financial Statistics. The ￿nal panel
employed in the empirical analysis contain information on 9,656 plants in total (4,954 plants per
year on average), yielding a total of 54,591 observations. The summary statistics are shown in
Table 1 (￿gures and tables appear at the end of the paper).
21See the Appendix for a detailed de￿nition of each of these occupations.
217.2 Empirical Strategy
To examine the partial equilibrium effect of increased international competition on plants’ relative
demand for skilled workers, we adopt the following econometric model:
Shareijt = X
0
ijt￿ + ￿Tariffjt + ￿i + ￿t + ￿ijt (54)
where i, j, and t index plant, industry and year, respectively. The dependent variable is the share of
skilled (non-manual) workers among the plant’s workforce related to the production process, Xijt
is a vector of other plant attributes that are included in some speci￿cations (and X
0
ijt its transpose),
and Tariffjt denotes the industry-speci￿c import tariff in industry j and period t. The ￿is are ￿xed-
effects capturing any time-invariant differences across plants, while the ￿ts are year ￿xed-effects
capturing any common macro-shocks affecting manufacturing plants each year.22 It is worth noting
that plants do not move between industries in our sample, implying that the plant ￿xed-effects also
take care of industry ￿xed-effects. As is standard in the literature (e.g., Keller and Yeaple, 2009),
inference relies on standard errors clustered by industry and year to account for the fact that plants
in the same industry are subject to the same level of import tariffs in a given year.
During the period of analysis, weighted import tariffs in the Chilean manufacturing sector
decreased from an average of 10.5 percent in 1996 to 2 percent in 2006. While tariffs fell across
the whole manufacturing sector, the magnitude and pace of the decline varied considerably across
industries; Figure 1 provides an illustration for a subset of 4-dig industries. These intersectoral
differences in differences play a key role in our identi￿cation strategy, which relies on within-
industry changes of these variables over time to identify the effect of interest. It is also worth
emphasizing that the use of static weights to construct Tariffjt obviates the concern that import
weights might be endogenous to movements in tariffs.
Reductions of import tariffs over the period of analysis resulted from the implementation of the
Uruguay Round from 1995 and increased participation in several preferential free trade agreements
(WTO, 2003, 2009). A potential concern with relying solely on import tariffs to identify the effect
of international competition is that they might not be strictly exogenous to plants, especially if em-
ployers (or their workers) have some ability to in￿uence such agreements. To address this concern,
we use industry-speci￿c (import-weighted) real exchange rates as an alternative measure. Given
that bilateral exchange rates are determined in international ￿nancial markers and their evolution
over time is largely unpredictable (especially in the case of a small open economy like Chile),
22The microeconometric empirical strategy we adopt is not suited to estimate the general equilibrium wage effects
of globalization emphasized by our theory. In the model, every ￿rm faces the same wage rates (wu and ws), implying
that wage changes due to trade liberalization would be captured by year dummies. We therefore focus on the partial
equilibrium effect of import competition on plants’ relative labor demand for skilled workers, which is a key driver of
the general equilibrium wage effects emphasized by our model.
22they can be used to capture an exogenous variation in the degree of international competition (Re-
venga, 1992; Bertrand, 2004). Figure 2 illustrates how these exchange rate indexes evolved over
the sample period for a number manufacturing industries.
7.3 Main Results
Table 2 presents our central estimates of the impact of international competition on the share of
skilled (non-manual) workers related to the production process within manufacturing plants. Col-
umn (1) reports the estimate of equation (54) without plant-level covariates. Consistent with the
import competition effect highlighted by our theory, the estimated effect of import tariffs is neg-
ative and signi￿cant at the 1 percent level. The point estimate indicates that if import tariffs fall
by 10 percentage points the share of skilled (non-manual) workers increases by about 9 percent-
age points, on average. Column (4) reports the results yielded by a similar speci￿cation, but using
industry-speci￿cexchangeratesasthemeasureofinternationalcompetition. Onceagaintheresults
are consistent with the competition effect: the estimated coef￿cient indicates that if the industry-
speci￿c real exchange rate appreciates by 10 percent, the share of skilled (non-manual) workers
increases by about 0.2 percentage points, on average. Columns (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) show that, for
both these variables, the magnitude of the estimates remains almost unchanged when controls for
plant size are included in the regressions. Finally, columns (7)-(9) show that the results remain
very similar when tariffs and real exchange rates are included simultaneously in the estimated
equation.23
7.4 Alternative Hypotheses
We proceed by examining the extent to which the results reported above might be explained by
a number of competing mechanisms. First, we worry that the rise in the share of skilled (non-
manual) workers linked to the production process might be fully explained by trade-induced skill-
biased process innovation. To address this concern, we modify our baseline model to control for
changes in labor productivity by simultaneously including employment and value added among
the regressors. The results reported in column (1) of Table 3 show that the coef￿cients of inter-
est remain virtually unaltered when controlling for changes in labor productivity, suggesting that
process innovation is not the main driver of the results.
As we noted in the introduction, the models of Yeaple (2005) and Verhoogen (2008) suggest
that, by triggering export market entry, improved access to foreign markets could impact on plants’
23As a robustness check, we have also clustered the standard errors at the plant level to account for serial correlation
of the error term within plants. The coef￿cients of interest remain always statistically signi￿cant at the 1 percent level
(results available upon request).
23relative demand for skilled workers. To the extent that reductions of import tariffs in Chile were
accompanied by a reciprocal decrease in export barriers imposed on Chilean plants, the above
estimates could potentially be contaminated by the mechanisms highlighted in these models. We
address this concern by modifying our baseline model in two different ways. First, we control for
plant-level exports. Second, we re-estimate the basic model on the sub-sample of ￿rms that do not
export in each year. In both cases, the results remain qualitatively unchanged, suggesting that these
competing mechanisms are not the key force behind our estimates (columns (2) and (3)).
We proceed by examining the extent to which our estimates might be driven by the FDI-
outsourcing hypothesis of Feenstra and Hanson (1996a,b). As these authors emphasize, demand
for skilled labor could increase in both developed and developing countries if the outsourced ac-
tivities are relatively low-skill in the former countries, but high-skill in the latter. To the extent that
lower tariffs facilitate such export-oriented outsourcing activities, our results might be partially
capturing this mechanism. We investigate this possibility by altering our baseline model in two
ways. In column (4), we include the share of foreign-owned capital among the regressors. The
estimates reveal that increases in foreign ownership are indeed associated with higher demand for
skilled workers. The coef￿cient on tariffs remains little changed, however, suggesting that the ef-
fect of tariffs is not solely driven by this mechanism. To investigate this aspect further, in column
(5) we re-estimate the basic model using data on ￿rms without any foreign-owned capital. Once
again the estimates remain very similar, suggesting that the FDI hypothesis is not the main driver
of our results. Further, it is worth emphasizing that the positive effect of a real exchange rate ap-
preciation on plants’ relative demand for skill is dif￿cult to reconcile with both the exporting and
the outsourcing hypotheses.
Finally, we would like to note that, while our plant data do not contain suitable measures of
innovation efforts towards horizontal product differentiation, there is a large body of recent evi-
dence suggesting that increased import competition fosters product innovation in both developed
and developing countries (Bertschek, 1995; Bloom, Draca and Van Reenen, 2009; Fernandes and
Paunov, 2009; Gorodnichenko, Svejnar and Terrel, 2010; Lu and Ng, 2009). Accepting that prod-
uct innovation is more skill-intensive than manual production activities, the estimates we provide
are therefore consistent with (and complementary to) this evidence.
7.5 Further Robustness Checks
A possible concern with the ￿xed-effects estimates presented above is that the dependent variable
is bounded in the interval [0,100]. For this reason, the least squares estimates might lead to pre-
dictions of the dependent variable outside the extreme points. Furthermore, when there are many
observations lying at the boundaries of the interval (or near them), linear regression might yield
24biased estimates due to its inability to deal with the inherent nonlinearities around those regions.
We address this concern by estimating Tobit random-effects models. Reassuringly, the results re-
main qualitatively unchanged: an inspection of Table 4 reveals that the marginal effects of both
measures of international competition have the expected sign, are signi￿cant at the 1 percent level,
and of a larger magnitude than those reported earlier.
Finally, we worry that there might be some lag in the translation of movements in tariffs and
exchange rates into adjustments of the labor force within plants. To account for this possibility, we
re-estimate our basic model using industry-speci￿c import tariffs and real exchange rate indexes
dated t ￿ 1 in the regressions. The results, shown in Table 5, are, once again, qualitatively similar.
8 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we develop a two-country, multi-sector model of oligopoly in general equilibrium
in which the degree of horizontal product differentiation is endogenously determined by ￿rms’
strategic investments in product innovation. We use the model to re-examine classic questions
of trade theory: the effect of freer trade on the distribution of national income, the intersectoral
allocation of resources, and aggregate welfare.
The building blocks of our theory are simple. Firms are large in their own industries, but small
relative to the economy as a whole. Hence they interact strategically against their foreign rivals in
their own sector, but treat parametrically all economy-wide variables. Consumers love variety and
product innovation is more skill intensive than production. Greater import competition increases
￿rms’ incentives to invest in differentiating their products from those produced by their foreign
rivals. Freer trade between similar nations can therefore increase the relative demand for skilled
labor, and thereby the skill premium. If skill upgrading is possible, there is a potential welfare
trade-off between output and variety. Provided that innovation incentives outweigh production
incentives, globalization might lead to less total output, but this will be compensated for by greater
product variety.
The import competition effect emphasized by our partial equilibrium analysis, which plays an
important role in determining the general equilibrium, is consistent with Chilean panel data on
manufacturing plants for the years 1996 to 2006. Using movements of industry-speci￿c import
tariffs and exchange rates to identify exogenous variations in the degree of import competition, we
￿nd that harsher market rivalry induces manufacturing plants to increase the share of skilled (non-
manual) workers among the workforce related to the production process. In addition, we provide
evidence that this effect is not fully driven by a number of competing mechanisms, notably process
innovation, exporting, foreign direct investment and outsourcing.
Themechanismsemphasizedbyourtheorycontributetoexplainanumberofimportantstylized
25facts, which together are dif￿cult to reconcile with the predictions of existing trade theories: the
increasing prevalence of intraindustry trade, rising wage inequality between skilled and unskilled
workers in both developed and developing countries, and slow aggregate productivity growth fol-
lowing trade liberalization.
By way of conclusion, we would like to discuss how different modelling choices for strategic
product innovation should be expected to in￿uence the impact of trade liberalization on relative
demand for skilled workers. For simplicity, we model product innovation as a pure public good
for the ￿rms in each industry. In the arguably more realistic case that innovation investments yield
greater returns to the investing ￿rm, innovation incentives would be stronger and more responsive
to freer trade. Accordingly, our model could be interpreted as providing a lower bound on the
likelihood that trade liberalization between similar nations increases the relative demand for skilled
labor, and thereby the skill premium.
Appendix
This appendix provides further details on the data sources and variables employed in the empirical
analysis.
Annual National Industrial Survey (ENIA)
The Annual National Industrial Survey (ENIA) of Chile is conducted yearly by the National Sta-
tistics Institute. All manufacturing plants with more than 10 employees are surveyed in each year.
A plant may exit the panel data set if its employment level falls below this threshold and re-enter
in a subsequent year if employment grows above this level again. The information on employment
is detailed by occupation. Table A.1 provides a detailed description of the occupational categories.
Imports, Tariffs and Real Exchange Rates
The plant-level data set was matched by 4-dig ISIC industry and year with information on industry-
speci￿c import tariffs and real exchange rate indexes. Industry-speci￿c tariffs are de￿ned as the
weighted average of the scheduled bilateral import tariff. The weights are the share of each coun-
try in total industry imports in a base period (1996-1997). Data on scheduled import tariffs by
industry-country come from the UNCTAD TRAINS data set. Information on imports (also by
industry-country) come from the UN COMTRADE data set. Due to unavailability of tariff data for
the years 1996 and 2003, a linear interpolation was made for these years using data for 1995-1997
and 2002-2004, respectively.
26Following Bertrand (2004), the industry-speci￿c real exchange rate index is de￿ned as the
weighted average of the log real exchange rates of the countries of origin, where the weights are
the share of each country in total industry imports in a base period (1996-1997). Real exchange
rates are nominal exchange rates (in foreign currency per Chilean peso) multiplied by the ratio
between the Chilean CPI and the foreign country’s CPI. Data on nominal bilateral exchange rates
and CPIs come from the IMF International Financial Statistics.
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 Table 1. Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean SD
Skilled (non-manual) workers related to the production process (number of employees) 12.7 46.6
Unskilled (manual) workers related to the production process (number of employees) 37.3 89.5
Share of skilled (non-manual) workers among workforce related to the production process (%) 31.5 39.2
Total employment (number of employees) 68.1 144.7
Total production (billions of pesos) 3.0 21.3
Value added (billions of pesos) 1.6 9.8
Exports (billions of pesos) 0.7 6.6
Foreign owned capital (% of total) 4.4 19.4
Tariff 7.3 3.1
Real exchange rate (log) -4.6 0.7
N 54591
 
Notes:  This table reports summary statistics on the panel data set used in the regression analysis. The 
period  





Table 2. Baseline Estimates 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tariff -0.924*** -0.942*** -0.941*** -0.849** -0.865*** -0.864***
(0.350) (0.347) (0.347) (0.336) (0.333) (0.333)
Real exchange rate 1.876*** 1.904*** 1.903*** 1.709*** 1.733*** 1.733***
(0.565) (0.566) (0.566) (0.549) (0.551) (0.551)
Total employment -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Production 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
N 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591
R
2 (within) 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.036 0.036
F-statistic 49.17 52.76 49.35 44.42 47.51 44.7 47.64 51.14 48.07
Share of skilled (non-manual) workers among workforce related to the production process
 
Notes: The estimated method is OLS with plant-fixed effects. All regressions include 10 year-
dummies. Standard errors clustered by industry-year are in parentheses (846 clusters). *** 









Table 3. Alternative Hypotheses 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)






Tariff -0.863*** -0.863*** -0.938** -0.861*** -0.937***
(0.333) (0.333) (0.365) (0.332) (0.336)
Real exchange rate 1.735*** 1.735*** 2.119*** 1.743*** 1.912***
(0.550) (0.550) (0.661) (0.550) (0.562)
Total employment -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.031***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Value added 0.021 0.022 0.043** 0.020 0.030*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.016)
Exports -0.004
(0.017)
Foreign capital (% of total) 0.042***
(0.014)
N 54591 54591 43513 54591 51317
R
2 (within) 0.036 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.038
F-statistic 48.38 45.18 41.33 45.47 51.4
Share of skilled (non-manual) workers among workforce related to the 
production process
 
Notes: The estimated method is OLS with plant-fixed effects. All regressions 
include 10 year-dummies. Standard errors clustered by industry-year are in 
parentheses (846 clusters). *** indicates significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; 
*** significant at 10%. 
 
 
 Table 4. Robustness Checks, Tobit Random Effects  
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tariff -1.572*** -1.595*** -1.581*** -1.489*** -1.511*** -1.495***
(0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355) (0.355)
Real exchange rate 2.332*** 2.360*** 2.411*** 2.166*** 2.191*** 2.244***
(0.606) (0.605) (0.605) (0.607) (0.607) (0.607)
Total employment -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.016*** -0.014*** -0.017***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Production 0.067*** 0.071*** 0.069***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
N 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591
Log likelihood -171754.1 -171744.58 -171739.81 -171756.51 -171747.1 -171741.83 -171747.74 -171738.06 -171732.98
X
2-statistic 1569.63 1590.59 1599.26 1564.6 1585.31 1594.93 1582.24 1603.53 1612.76
Share of skilled (non-manual) workers among workforce related to the production process
 
Notes: The estimated method is Tobit with plant random-effects. All regressions include 10 year-
dummies. Standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10%. 
 
 
Table 5. Robustness Checks, Lagged Tariffs and Exchange Rates 
Dependent variable:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tariff t-1 -1.063*** -1.093*** -1.092*** -0.966** -0.995*** -0.994***
(0.395) (0.389) (0.389) (0.382) (0.376) (0.376)
Real exchange rate t-1 1.547*** 1.579*** 1.578*** 1.297*** 1.322*** 1.321***
(0.529) (0.528) (0.528) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Total employment -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.023*** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Production 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
N 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591 54591
R
2 (within) 0.033 0.0352 0.0352 0.0333 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.035 0.035
F-Statistic 47.54 51.49 48.23 43.48 46.57 43.84 45.65 49.40 46.5
Share of skilled (non-manual) workers among workforce related to the production process
 
Notes: The estimated method is OLS with plant-fixed effects. All regressions include 10 year-dummies. 
Standard errors clustered by industry-year are in parentheses (846 clusters). *** indicates significant at 
1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
           
 Table A1. Occupational Categories in ENIA 
Occupation Definition
Skilled (non-manual) workers related to the production process
Professional, technical and skilled workers directly related to 
the production process, controlling and directing the process.
Unskilled (manual) workers related to the production process
Manual workers directly or indirectly linked to the production 
process.
Owners, partners and family workers
Owners and partners that participate actively in the plant's 
activities. Family workers without fixed pay dedicating over 15 
hours per week to the plant.
Directors
Managers and directors hired to direct the plant (who are not 
owners of the plant).
Other staff not related to the production process
Workers responsible for administrative and accounting 
control, workers performing security and personal services, 
and salesman.
 
 
 
 